University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Law Faculty Publications

6-19-2014

Same Sex Marriage in a Post-Perry and Windsor America
Kathryn L. Moore
University of Kentucky College of Law, kmoore@uky.edu

Allison I. Connelly
University of Kentucky College of Law, connelly@uky.edu

Ross T. Ewing
McBrayer, rewing@mmlk.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Family Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Retirement Security
Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Repository Citation
Moore, Kathryn L.; Connelly, Allison I.; and Ewing, Ross T., "Same Sex Marriage in a Post-Perry and
Windsor America" (2014). Law Faculty Scholarly Articles. 565.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/565

This Presentation is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Same Sex Marriage in a Post-Perry and Windsor America
Notes/Citation Information
Allison I. Connelly, Ross T. Ewing & Kathryn L. Moore, Same Sex Marriage in a Post-Perry and Windsor
America, Presentation at the Kentucky Bar Association Annual Convention (June 19, 2014).

This presentation is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/565

SAME SEX MARRIAGE IN A
POST-PERRY AND WINDSOR
AMERICA

Sponsor: Young Lawyers Division
CLE Credit: 1.0
Thursday, June 19, 2014
9:40 a.m. - 10:40 a.m.
Ballroom B
Northern Kentucky Convention Center
Covington, Kentucky

A NOTE CONCERNING THE PROGRAM MATERIALS

The materials included in this Kentucky Bar Association Continuing Legal
Education handbook are intended to provide current and accurate information about the
subject matter covered. No representation or warranty is made concerning the
application of the legal or other principles discussed by the instructors to any specific
fact situation, nor is any prediction made concerning how any particular judge or jury will
interpret or apply such principles. The proper interpretation or application of the
principles discussed is a matter for the considered judgment of the individual legal
practitioner. The faculty and staff of this Kentucky Bar Association CLE program
disclaim liability therefore. Attorneys using these materials, or information otherwise
conveyed during the program, in dealing with a specific legal matter have a duty to
research original and current sources of authority.

Printed by: Evolution Creative Solutions
7107 Shona Drive
Cincinnati, Ohio 45237
Kentucky Bar Association

TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Presenters................................................................................................................. i

Life after DOMA: The Legal Landscape.......................................................................... 1

Tying the Knot Federally: What Will It Mean for Kentucky Same-Sex Couples? ........... 17

Social Security and Other Employee Benefits for
Same-Sex Couples after Windsor ................................................................................. 25

THE PRESENTERS

Professor Allison I. Connelly
University of Kentucky
College of Law Legal Clinic
630 Maxwelton Court
Lexington, KY 40506
(859) 257-4692
connelly@uky.edu
PROFESSOR ALLISON I. CONNELLY is the Thomas P. Lewis Clinical Professor of
Law at the University of Kentucky College of Law. She teaches litigation skills, criminal
procedure, criminal trial process, legal writing and is the Director of the Kentucky Legal
Education Opportunity Summer Institute. Prior to joining the faculty at UK, Professor
Connelly spent thirteen years as a state public defender. She is the first and only woman
to have been named as Kentucky’s Public Advocate. Professor Connelly received her
B.A. and J.D. from the University of Kentucky. She is the founder of the Kentucky
Intrastate Mock Trial Competition and serves as the coach of U.K’s trial teams.
Professor Connelly is the recipient of the 2011 Kentucky Bar Association Service to
Young Lawyers Award, the 2011 NAACP Award for the Empowerment of Underserved
Populations, and the 2009 UK Alumni Association Great Teacher Award.

Ross T. Ewing
Gess Mattingly & Atchison, PSC
201 West Short Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
(859) 252-9000
rewing@gmalaw.com

ROSS T. EWING is an associate with Gess Mattingly & Atchison, PSC in Lexington,
where he focuses his practice in the areas of family law, estate planning and probate.
Prior to joining Gess Mattingly & Atchison, Mr. Ewing served as law clerk for a family
court judge and maintained a private practice. He received his B.A. from the University
of Kentucky and his J.D. from the University of Kentucky College of Law. Mr. Ewing is
admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the Eastern and Western
Districts of Kentucky, United States Tax Court and the United States Supreme Court.
He is a member of the Fayette County and Kentucky Bar Associations. Mr. Ewing has
volunteered for the Fayette County Pro Bono Program, which named him 2010 Attorney
of the Year, the Kentucky Grandparents as Parents Conference, the Bluegrass Domestic
Violence Program, and AIDS Volunteers, Inc.

i

Kathryn L. Moore
University of Kentucky College of Law, Room 146
South Limestone Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40506
(859) 257-7637
kmoore@uky.edu

KATHRYN L. MOORE teaches Property, Land Use Planning, Employee Benefits, and
State and Local Tax at the University of Kentucky College of Law. Her research focuses
on employee benefits and Social Security reform. Professor Moore is co-author of the
casebook, The Law of Employee Pension and Welfare Benefits (2d ed. 2008). She also
serves as an Associate Senior Editor for the ABA Section of Labor and Employment
Law’s Employee Benefit Law treatise. Her articles have appeared in such journals as
the Washington & Lee Law Review, the Ohio State Law Journal, and the Arizona State
Law Review. Prior to teaching, Professor Moore was a Tax/ERISA associate with the
DC law firm of Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, and clerked for then-U.S. District Court
Chief Judge Harold M. Fong in Honolulu, Hawaii. Professor Moore currently serves on
the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment. In addition, she is a member
of the American Law Institute and National Academy of Social Insurance.

ii

LIFE AFTER DOMA: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Professor Allison I. Connelly & Julie Butcher

We made a commitment to each other in our love and lives, and now had the legal
commitment, called marriage, to match. Isn't that what marriage is? ... I have lived long
enough now to see big changes. The older generation's fears and prejudices have given
way, and today's young people realize that if someone loves someone they have a right
to marry... I believe all Americans, no matter their race, no matter their sex, no matter
their sexual orientation, should have that same freedom to marry. Government has no
business imposing some people's religious beliefs over others... I support the freedom to
marry for all. That's what Loving, and loving, are all about.
Mildred Loving, Loving for All, Public Statement on the
40th Anniversary of Loving v. Virginia (June 12, 2007),
cited in Bostic v. Rainey, 2014 WL 561978 (E.D. Va., Feb.
14, 2014).
I.

THE FAULT LINES: CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A.

Article IV, Section 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."

B.

Fifth Amendment: "No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ..."

C.

Fourteenth Amendment... "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."

D.

Kentucky Constitution, Section One: "All men are, by nature, free and
equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may
be reckoned ... The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and
happiness..."

E.

Kentucky Constitution, Section Two: "Absolute and arbitrary power over
the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not
even in the largest majority."

F.

Kentucky Constitution, Section Three: "All men, when they form a social
compact, are equal; and no grant of exclusive, separate public
emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man or set of men ..."
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II.

G.

Kentucky Constitution, Section 233A: "Only a marriage between one man
and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky.
A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized."

H.

KRS 402.020(1)(d): "Marriage is prohibited and void: ... between members of the same sex."

TREMORS
A.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
The Court struck two statutes criminalizing miscegenation under the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses. Virginia was one of sixteen states
at the time that prohibited and punished marriages on the basis of racial
classifications. The lower court concluded that marriage had "traditionally
been subject to state regulation without federal intervention, and,
consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state
control by the Tenth Amendment." The state gave up that argument
before the Supreme Court and argued instead that Fourteenth
Amendment didn't apply to its miscegenation laws.
The Supreme Court found a due process violation holding, "The freedom
to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." The Court also
held the statutes violated the equal protection clause holding, "There is
patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial
discrimination which justifies this classification. . . There can be no doubt
that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 11-12.

B.

Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), holding that the
Constitution does not protect "a fundamental right" "for same-sex couples
to get married." Baker appealed and on October 10, 1972, the Supreme
Court ordered, "Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn. Dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question." Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
Baker is precedent because Supreme Court review was mandatory.
Therefore, the dismissal operated as a decision on the merits.

C.

Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. App. 1973), holding there is no
constitutional right to have a marriage license issued to two persons of
the same sex because same sex couples are incapable of entering into a
marriage as that term is defined by common usage.

D.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), holding constitutional a
Georgia statute criminalizing adult same sex consensual conduct
because "none of the rights announced in [prior cases] bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage
in acts of sodomy ... No connection between family, marriage, or
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has
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been demonstrated... Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and
was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when they ratified
the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of
the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961,
all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of
Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in
private and between consenting adults. Against this background, to claim
that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at
best, facetious." Id. at 193-194.
E.

Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992), holding
unconstitutional a statute criminalizing consensual "homosexual sodomy"
because it violates the right of privacy and equal protection under
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution.

F.

1993: Hawaii Supreme Court rules that a ban on gay marriage violates
the Hawaii Constitution, but five years later a constitutional amendment is
passed defining marriage between one man and one woman.

G.

December 1993: "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" implemented.

H.

1995: Utah passes the first "mini-DOMA" legislation prohibiting same sex
marriage. More than thirty other states will follow.

I.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), a 6-3 Kennedy opinion, striking
down, under the Equal Protection Clause, a Colorado constitutional
amendment that prevented the state and any city, county or school district
from providing "official protections" based on sexual orientation.

J.

1996: President Clinton signs the Defense of Marriage Act into law. The
law defines marriage as a legal union between one man and one woman
and that no state is required to recognize a same-sex marriage from out
of state.

K.

April 26, 2000: Vermont becomes the first state in the U.S. to legalize
civil unions and registered partnerships between same-sex couples.

L.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), a 6-3 Kennedy opinion overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, and holding unconstitutional a Texas statute
that criminalized consensual, adult homosexual intercourse as illegal
sodomy under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. "The
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." Id. at 578.

M.

Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003),
the first state court decision to find that same-sex couples had the right to
marry because the prohibition denied "the dignity and equality of all
individuals," making them "second class citizens."
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N.

November 2004: Kentucky passes Section 233A, a "mini-DOMA"
constitutional amendment defining marriage as between one man and
one woman.

O.

December 2010: The repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell becomes law.

P.

June 2013: Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013) and U.S. v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) decided.

Q.

The Current Landscape as of April 1, 2014:
1.

Since Windsor, not a single state's same sex marriage ban has
survived federal court challenge. See, Human Rights Campaign,
American for Marriage Equality, http://www.hrc.org/pressreleases, visited April 14, 2014.

2.

Marriage equality has been legalized in seventeen states:
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington and the District of Columbia. Thirty-seven percent of
the country lives in a marriage equality state. See, N. Flaherty,
Marriage Equality USA, http://www.marriageequality.org/nationalmap, visited April 10, 2014.
Three states provide the equivalent of state level marriage rights
to same sex couples: Colorado, District of Columbia and Oregon.
Id.

3.

4.

Thirty-three states have same sex marriage bans through either
legislation or constitutional amendments or both.
a.

Hawaii has an amendment that gives the legislature the
authority to define marriage.

b.

Nine states have amendments that prohibit same sex
marriage only: Alaska, Nevada, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Oregon, Colorado, Tennessee and Arizona.

c.

Eighteen states have amendments that prohibit same sex
marriage and civil unions: Nebraska, Arkansas, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah,
Kansas, Texas, Alabama, Idaho, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Wisconsin, Florida, and North Carolina.

d.

Two states prohibit same sex marriage, civil unions and
other contracts: Michigan and Virginia. Id.

Ten state constitutional amendments or statutes have been found
unconstitutional or have been repealed by state supreme courts or
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U.S. District Courts: California, Nevada, Michigan, Oklahoma,
Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Texas, and Utah.

III.

a.

Seven state attorney generals from Kentucky, Nevada,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, California and Illinois,
have refused to defend marriage bans on same sex
marriages.

b.

Ohio, Tennessee and Kentucky's rulings are limited to the
recognition of out of state same sex marriages.

5.

Same sex marriage court cases have been filed in at least "28
states and Puerto Rico and account for 250 plaintiffs taking on
state marriage bans." Id.

6.

There are five federal circuit courts that will rule in nine same sex
marriage cases in the coming months. They are: Fourth Circuit
(Virginia), Fifth Circuit (Texas), Ninth Circuit (Nevada), Tenth
Circuit (separate cases from Utah, Wyoming, Kansas, Colorado,
and Oklahoma) and four cases from the Sixth Circuit (Tennessee,
Kentucky, Michigan and Ohio.) The Sixth Circuit is the only federal
appeals court so far to consider same sex marriage cases "from
all states within its jurisdiction." Id.

7.

Only five states, Alaska, Georgia, Montana, North Dakota and
South Dakota, ban same sex marriage but have no current court
cases challenging their constitutionality. See, Human Rights
Campaign, Press Room, Cases, Coast to Coast, at
http://www.hrc.org/press-releases, visited April 14, 2014.

THE FIRST QUAKE: PERRY
A.

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013)
In Perry, the Court didn't reach the question whether California's
Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by "defining marriage solely as the union of a man and a
woman."
In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Scalia,
Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan, the Court held that the "proponents" of
Proposition 8, five California residents, lacked standing to appeal the
judgment of the U.S. District Court invalidating the state ballot initiative.
"We have never before upheld the standing of a private party to defend
the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not
to. We decline to do so for the first time here." Id. at 2655. The Court
found that the "proponents," who stepped in when the State refused to
appeal the trial court's ruling, had only a "generalized" interest in
upholding the validity of Prop. 8. "Their only interest in having the District
Court order reversed was to vindicate the constitutional validity of a
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generally applicable California Law. We have repeatedly held that such a
generalized grievance, no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer
standing." Id. at 2658. In short, the proponents had no "concrete and
particularized injury." Id.
B.

Impact
Same sex couples in California can now marry. There is concern that the
ruling will permit state officials "unchecked power to nullify ballot initiatives
they dislike by refusing to enforce them or defend them in court." Valerie
Richardson, "Critics Say Supreme Court's Prop 8 Ruling Takes Power
from Voters, Gives It to State Officials," (June 30, 2013,)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/30/critics-say-supremecourts-proposition-8-ruling-ta/#ixzz2n0AOAapi

IV.

THE EARTHQUAKE: A TALE OF TWO RATIONALES: U.S. V. WINDSOR 1
A.

Facts
After living as a couple for nearly forty years, Edith Windsor and Thea
Spyer, New York residents, got married in 2007 in Toronto, Canada,
where same sex marriage was legal. New York recognized the marriage
because they had registered as domestic partners in 1993. Spyer died in
2009. She left her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor tried to claim the
federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses, but her claim was
denied by the IRS. The IRS stated that "for federal tax purposes, a
'marriage' means only a legal union between a man and a woman as
husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' means a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife." The regulations language was required
under §3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738C, which defined
"marriage" and "spouse" as legal unions between a man and a woman.
Because of DOMA's definition of marriage, the federal government
imposed a $363,053 tax on Spyer's estate. If the U.S. government had
recognized the marriage, the estate would have qualified for the spousal
exemption and Windsor would not have had any tax liability.
Windsor filed suit under the Fifth Amendment challenging the
constitutionality of §3 of DOMA under the Equal Protection Clause. She
sought a refund of the federal estate tax. The government defended
DOMA at first, but changed its position and decided not to defend DOMA
in court. In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the
House of Representatives voted to intervene in the lawsuit and to defend
the constitutionality of §3.

1

570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) (5-4 Kennedy opinion joined by Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor and Kagan with Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito dissenting).
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B.

Threshold Holding
The Court had jurisdiction to hear the case because there was a sufficient
controversy under Article III. The refund the District Court ordered the
government to pay, and which the U.S. had refused to pay, constituted a
"real and immediate economic injury." See, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975). Prudential considerations – "matters of judicial selfgovernance" – were also met under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
BLAG's "substantial adversarial argument for Section 3's constitutionality
satisfies prudential concerns that otherwise might counsel against hearing
an appeal from a decision with which the principal parties agree." Id. at
2687-2688.

C.

Merits Holding
1.

"The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection
and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected
than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 2696.

2.

In other words, the Court held that DOMA created a subset of
state sanctioned marriages that were treated unequally to other
state sanctioned marriages; and that the federal government
cannot overturn a particular state's decision in defining marriage.
As such, if a state decides to recognize same-sex marriages,
federal law must respect that choice.

3.

"By history and tradition the definition and regulation of marriage
... has been treated as being within the authority and realm of the
separate States." Id. at 2690. "The State's power in defining the
martial relation is of central relevance in this case ... Here the
State's decision to give this class of persons the right to marry
conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import.
When the State used its historic and essential authority to define
the marital relation in this way, its role and its power in making the
decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the
class in their own community. DOMA because of its reach and
extent, departs from this history and tradition of reliance on state
law to define marriage." Id. at 2692.

4.

"DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect.
By doing so it violates basic due process and equal protection
principles applicable to the Federal Government … The Constitution's guarantee of equality 'must at the very least mean that a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot' justify disparate treatment of that group…" Id. at 2693.
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D.

5.

"DOMA's unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing
and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to
deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that
come with the federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong
evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of
that class. The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law
here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status,
and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages
made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States." Id.

6.

DOMA's "demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State
decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be
treated as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law.
This raises a most serious question under the Constitution's Fifth
Amendment... DOMA's operation in practice confirms this purpose
... DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code...
DOMA's principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned
marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to
impose inequality ..." Id. at 2693- 2694.

Two Rationales Become One: Federalism/State Sovereignty and Liberty
1.

One rationale is based on federalism. The rationale is framed on
the states' "historic and essential authority to define the martial
relation." Id. at 2692. "The Court ruled that if a state exercises its
sovereign power and recognizes same sex marriage, federal law
"must respect that choice." The opinion notes that laws
recognizing same sex marriage "eliminate inequality," but the
choice to recognize the marriage is "within the realm and authority
of the separate States." Id. Because DOMA's definition of
marriage created "two contradictory marriage regimes with the
same State," it was unconstitutional. Congress' definition of
marriage in §3 "interfered" with "state sovereign choices"
regarding marriage and relegated same sex marriages to "second
tier" status.

2.

In novel reasoning, the opinion uses state law to recognize a
protected right or liberty within its borders against a federal
statute. The Court notes that DOMA raised major concerns that it
was the product of animus. First, the legislative record is clear
regarding Congress' view that same-sex marriage is immoral and
"un-Christian."
a.

Second, "In determining whether a law is motivated by an
improper animus or purpose, 'discriminations of an unusual
character' especially require careful consideration. DOMA
cannot survive under these principles." Id. at 2693. DOMA
departs from tradition and doesn't let the states decide who
is married. This "is strong evidence of a law having the
purpose and effect of disapproval of that class." Id.
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E.

b.

The Court concluded, "The avowed purpose and practical
effect of the law here in question are to impose a
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all
who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the
unquestioned authority of the States." Id.

c.

The Court said, "The congressional goal was 'to put a
thumb on the scales and influence a state's decision as to
how to shape its own marriage laws.' The Act's
demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State
decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions
will be treated as second-class marriages for purposes of
federal law. This raises a most serious question under the
Constitution's Fifth Amendment." Id. at 2693-94.

d.

"The power the Constitution grants it also restrains. And
though Congress has great authority to design laws to fit
its own conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 2695.

e.

"The principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law
are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex
marriage. This requires the Court to hold, as it now does,
that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the
liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution." Id.

A Note on Dissents
1.

Scalia predicted that Kennedy's language that DOMA's "principal
purpose is to impose inequality," "would show up in future suits
challenging state laws and state constitutional amendments."
He's right. Seventy-five opinions have already cited Windsor.

2.

"We have no power to decide this case. And even if we did, we
have no power under the Constitution to invalidate this
democratically adopted legislation. The Court's errors on both
points spring forth from the same diseased root: an exalted
conception of the role of this institution in America." Id. at 26972698.

3.

"In the majority's telling, this story is black-and-white: hate your
neighbor or come along with us. The truth is more complicated. It
is hard to admit that one's political opponents are not monsters,
especially in a struggle like this one, and the challenge in the end
proves more than today's Court can handle. Too bad." Id. at
2711.

4.

Roberts was more measured. He said he "would not tar the
political branches with the brush of bigotry without more
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convincing evidence that the Act's principal purpose was to codify
malice." Id. at 2696.
F.

V.

What Windsor Did Not Hold or Do
1.

It did not decide whether the Constitution guarantees the right to
same-sex marriages or whether the Constitution forbids state
bans on such marriages. "This opinion and its holding are
confined to those lawful marriages," meaning those states that
have recognized or may recognize in the future same sexmarriages. Id. at 2696.

2.

The opinion does not decide "whether the States in their 'historic
and essential authority to define the martial relation may continue
to utilize the traditional definition of marriage." Id. at 2696 (Roberts
dissent).

3.

The opinion did not articulate a clear test or level of judicial review
in judging LGBT or same-sex marriage cases.

4.

The opinion did not implicitly or explicitly discuss §2 of DOMA,
which gives the states the right to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages performed in other states.

5.

The opinion did not reach couples who are barred from marrying
in the thirty-three "mini-DOMA" states where same-sex marriage is
prohibited.

U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL AFTERSHOCKS
A.

Caveat: This is only a brief sampling of cases after Windsor and does not
include the many cases in the pipeline. One headline appropriately said,
"Weeks after Key Part of Federal Marriage Act is Struck Down,
Preliminary Findings Show Decision Could Reshape Laws." This section
includes potential federal arguments that can be made. However, don't
forget §§§1, 2 and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution.

B.

Full Faith and Credit: §2 of DOMA: Are states constitutionally required to
recognize same-sex marriages that were celebrated in states that
sanction same-sex marriages?
1.

Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 291 (1942)
holds that the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit clause is "to
alter the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the
laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make
them integral parts of a single nation."

2.

Academics disagree on whether DOMA violates the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.
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Many academics say §2 is constitutional under the second
sentence of the clause; "And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
Since Congress has the right to control the "effect" of the Acts,
Records and Proceedings, it is controlling the "effect" of same-sex
marriage recognition through §2 of DOMA.
3.

C.

Other academics argue that even though Congress has the
authority to define the "effect" of the Acts, Congress does not have
the authority to limit the scope of the Full Faith and Credit clause.

Equal Protection & Due Process
1.

Love v. Beshear (formerly Bourke v. Beshear), No. 3:13-cv-750-H,
2014 WL 556729, at 1 (W.D. Ky. February 12, 2014), appealed to
the Sixth Circuit but holding "that Kentucky's denial of recognition
for valid same-sex marriages violates the United States
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law, even
under the most deferential standard of review. Accordingly,
Kentucky's statutes and constitutional amendment that mandate
this denial are unconstitutional."

2.

Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F.Supp.2d 968, 978, 983 (S.D Ohio,
2013), holding "where same-sex couples legally marry outside of
Ohio and then reside in Ohio, a different right than the
fundamental right to marry is also implicated: here, the
constitutional due process right at issue is not the right to marry,
but, instead, the right not to be deprived of one's already-existing
legal marriage and its attendant benefits and protections. In
addition to concluding that Ohio's marriage recognition bans are
an impermissible and unconstitutional burden on Plaintiffs'
significant liberty interest in the continued existence and
recognition of their marriages under the Due Process Clause, this
Court further finds and declares that Plaintiffs have also
demonstrated that Ohio's same-sex marriage recognition bans
further violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by denying them
equal protection of the laws.

3.

Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13–cv–501, 2013 WL 3814262 (S.D
Ohio, Jul. 22, 2013), holding based on Windsor, that interstate
recognition is required under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Court granted a temporary restraining
order requiring Ohio to recognize a marriage between two Ohio
men who married in Maryland.

4.

Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-cv-00129TSB, 2014 WL 1418395 (S.D.
Ohio, Apr. 14, 2014), holding unconstitutional Ohio's "marriage
amendment" because of Ohio's refusal to recognize out of state
same sex marriages. "There can be no circumstance under which
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this discriminatory classification is constitutional, as it was
intended to, and on its face does stigmatize and disadvantage
same sex couples and their families, denying only to them
protected rights to recognition of their marriages and violating the
guarantee of equal protection."
5.

Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F.Supp.2d 939 (E. Dist. Mich. 2013),
holding that five Michigan state employee plaintiffs have a
"likelihood of succeeding" on their claim under the Equal
Protection Clause that the state must provide benefits to their
same-sex partners.

6.

Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011), holding that LGBT
state employees with committed same-sex life partners have a
"likelihood of succeeding" on their claim under the Equal
Protection Clause that Arizona's statute of limiting eligibility for
family health care coverage to married heterosexual employees is
unconstitutional.

7.

Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F.Supp.2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013); appealed
to Tenth Circuit and arguments were heard on April 10, 2014. The
court held that Utah's state constitutional ban on same sex
marriage was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The State's
current laws deny its gay and lesbian citizens their fundamental
right to marry and, in doing so demean the dignity of these same
sex couples for no rational reason."

8.

Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F.Supp.2d 1252, 1282 (N.D.
Okla. 2014); appealed to Tenth Circuit, but holding Oklahoma's
state constitutional ban on same sex marriage unconstitutional
based on Windsor, and under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ban served
no rational purpose. The state's justifications, such as procreation,
wasn't rationally related to a marriage ban for same sex couples.
Moreover, the state's ban "intentionally discriminates against
[same sex couples] – for two reasons. First, Part A's disparate
impact upon same-sex couples desiring to marry is stark. Its effect
is to prevent every same-sex couple in Oklahoma from receiving a
marriage license, and no other couple. This is not a case where
the law has a small or incidental effect on the defined class; it is a
total exclusion of only one group."

9.

De Leon v. Perry, No. 5:13-cv-00982-OLG, 2014 WL 715741
(W.D. Tex., Feb. 26, 2014); appealed to the Fifth Circuit. De Leon
holds Texas' state constitutional ban on same sex marriage
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. "Texas' current marriage laws deny homosexual couples
the right to marry, and in doing so, demean their dignity for no
legitimate reason." The ban couldn't survive under even the most
deferential rational basis level of review. Moreover, under Due
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Process, "By denying plaintiff's the fundamental right to marry,
Texas denies their relationship the same status and dignity
afforded to citizens who are permitted to marry. It also denies
them the legal, social and financial benefits of marriage that
opposite sex couples enjoy."
10.

Bostic v. Rainey, (formerly Bostic v. McDonnell), No. 2:13cv395,
2014 WL 561978, (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014); appealed to the
Fourth Circuit but holding that, "Virginia's marriage laws
unconstitutionally deny Virginia's gay and lesbian citizens the
fundamental freedom to choose to marry. Marriage is a
fundamental right under the Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses, and any limitation on that right is subject to strict
scrutiny."

11.

DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 12–CV–10285, 2014 WL 1100794, (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 21, 2014); appealed to the Sixth Circuit but holding the
Michigan Marriage Amendment unconstitutional as not rationally
related to the governmental interest of child rearing. Tradition and
morality are not rationally based.

12.

Other due process arguments.
a.

"A person who legally marries in her home state, then pulls
up stakes and moves to another state, acquires a
significant liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause in the ongoing
existence of her marriage." Steve Sanders, "The
Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same Sex Marriage,"
110 Mich. L. Rev. 1421, 1422 (June 2012).

b.

Sanders argues that, "This liberty interest creates a right of
marriage recognition that is conceptually and doctrinally
distinguishable from any constitutional "right to marry... " It
is a neutral principle, grounded in core Due Process
Clause values: protection of normative expectations about
marital and family privacy (if a state can't take away your
child without due process, how can it take away your
spouse?); respect for established legal and social practices
(state-to-state marriage recognition is a longstanding
default rule); and rejection of the idea that a state can
unilaterally sever a legal family relationship without
important, proven justifications." Steve Sanders, "Next on
the Agenda for Marriage Equality Litigators…," SCOTUS
Blog,
(June
26,
2013,
5:40
p.m.)
http://www.scotusblog.com

c.

DOMA, Sanders argues, also implicates "horizontal
federalism: the obligations states owe one another as
coequal sovereigns." Id. "If it is intolerable to have 'two
contradictory marriage regimes within the same State,'
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then why is it more rational to have two contradictory
marriage regimes in the same country?" Id.
D.

Privileges and Immunities: The Right to Travel
The Right to Travel "found in the Privileges and Immunities Clause ... is
'fundamental' and includes the right to 'migrate,' and the State may not
impose a penalty upon those who exercise [that] right." Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).

VI.

1.

The Right to Travel requires the use of strict scrutiny without the
need of a suspect class. Any law "serving to penalize the exercise
of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).

2.

Tanco v. Haslam, (M.D. Tenn., October 21, 2013): Four legally
married same-sex couples have filed suit challenging Tennessee's
laws that prevent the state from recognizing their marriages and
treating them the same as all other legally married couples in
Tennessee. The lawsuit argues that Tennessee's laws prohibiting
recognition of the couples' marriages violate the federal
Constitution's guarantees of equal protection and due process and
the constitutionally protected right to travel between states and to
move to other states.

ON THE HORIZON IN KENTUCKY: SOME FUTURE CHALLENGES &
AFTERSHOCKS
A.

Pending Kentucky Lawsuits (from Marriage
http://www.marriageequality.org/lawsuits)
1.

Equality

USA

at

Commonwealth v. Bobbie Jo Clary, Jefferson Circuit Court, Case
No. 11-CR-003329: Bobbie Jo Clary is charged with murder of a
neighbor in Louisville, Kentucky. In July 2013, prosecutors wanted
Geneva Case to testify against her wife, Bobbie Jo Clary, in the
murder trial. Prosecutors say Case heard Clary admit to the
murder. Case invoked Kentucky's martial privilege, KRE 504. The
Commonwealth is refusing to recognize Clary's and Case's 2004
Vermont civil union, which in 2009 could be automatically
converted to a Vermont marriage (although Clary and Case never
applied for a marriage license.) On September 23, 2013, a judge
ruled that Ms. Case must testify against her own
spouse, reasoning was that since Clary and Case are in a civil
union, they are not considered married in Vermont, so even if
Kentucky's marriage ban were unconstitutional, it would not allow
the couple to invoke spousal privilege. Nevertheless, the court
said that it's "abundantly clear" that Kentucky doesn't recognize
same-sex marriages within the state or from other states.
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2.

Kentucky Equality Federation v. Governor Steve Beshear, et al.:
On September 10, 2013, a lawsuit was filed in Franklin Circuit
Court challenging §233A, the 2004 constitutional amendment
banning same-sex civil marriage. In response, the Attorney
General's Office said that plaintiffs, Lindsey Bain and Daniel
Rogers, a married same-sex couple, don't have "standing to
challenge our state definition of marriage and that their claim does
not qualify as an 'injury in fact' and so is not ripe for adjudication."
In a joint filing dated September 30, Conway and
Governor Beshear "deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to the
requested relief or any other relief whatsoever."

3.

B.

Romero v. Romero: On October 25, 2013, Alysha Romero filed a
dissolution petition from Rebecca Sue Romero in Jefferson Family
Court. The Romeros were legally married in Massachusetts in
2009. This filing is the state's first dissolution involving a samesex couple who were married in another state where same-sex
marriages are legal, and who want to end their marriage in
Kentucky.

KRS 411.130: Kentucky's Wrongful Death Statute
§411.130. Action for wrongful death – Personal
representative to prosecute – Distribution of amount
recovered.
(1) Whenever the death of a person results from an injury
inflicted by the negligence or wrongful act of another,
damages may be recovered for the death from the person
who caused it, or whose agent or servant caused it. If the
act was willful or the negligence gross, punitive damages
may be recovered. The action shall be prosecuted by the
personal representative of the deceased.
(2) The amount recovered, less funeral expenses and the
cost of administration and costs of recovery including
attorney fees, not included in the recovery from the
defendant, shall be for the benefit of and go to the kindred
of the deceased in the following order:
(a) If the deceased leaves a widow or husband,
and no children or their descendants, then the whole to
the widow or husband.
(b) If the deceased leaves a widow and children or
a husband and children, then one-half (1/2) to the widow
or husband and the other one-half (1/2) to the children of
the deceased.
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(c) If the deceased leaves a child or children, but
no widow or husband, then the whole to the child or
children.
(d) If the deceased leaves no widow, husband or
child, then the recovery shall pass to the mother and
father of the deceased, one (1) moiety each, if both are
living; if the mother is dead and the father is living, the
whole thereof shall pass to the father; and if the father is
dead and the mother living, the whole thereof shall go to
the mother. In the event the deceased was an adopted
person, "mother" and "father" shall mean the adoptive
parents of the deceased.
(e) If the deceased leaves no widow, husband or
child, and if both father and mother are dead, then the
whole of the recovery shall become a part of the personal
estate of the deceased, and after the payment of his
debts the remainder, if any, shall pass to his kindred more
remote than those above named, according to the law of
descent and distribution.
C.

KRS 411.145: Kentucky's Loss of Consortium Statute
(1) As used in this section "consortium" means the right to
the services, assistance, aid, society, companionship and
conjugal relationship between husband and wife, or wife
and husband.
(2) Either a wife or husband may recover damages against
a third person for loss of consortium, resulting from a
negligent or wrong.
Martin v. Ohio County Hosp. Corp., 295 S.W.3d 104 (Ky. 2009), holding
that surviving spouse's loss of consortium damages extend beyond the
death of the injured.

D.

Other Statutory Challenges
Aside from §233A of the Kentucky Constitution, attack KRS 402.045(1)
and (2).
1.

"A marriage between members of the same sex which occurs in
another jurisdiction shall be void in Kentucky." KRS 402.045(1).

2.

"Any rights granted by virtue of the marriage, or its termination,
shall be unenforceable in Kentucky courts." KRS 402.045(2).

3.

"Any clerk who knowingly issues a marriage license to any
persons [same sex couples] prohibited by this chapter from
marrying shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and removed
from office by the judgment of the court in which he is convicted.
KRS 402.990(6).
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TYING THE KNOT FEDERALLY: WHAT WILL IT MEAN
FOR KENTUCKY SAME-SEX COUPLES?
Ross T. Ewing 1

I.

KEY LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS POST-WINDSOR AFFECTING SAME-SEX
MARRIED COUPLES LIVING IN KENTUCKY, OR OTHER "NONRECOGNITION" (FOR NOW) STATES
A.

Taxes
1.

Federal taxes.
The IRS will consider all same-sex married couples as married for
federal tax purposes, regardless of place of domicile. This
includes income taxes, gift and estate taxes, personal and
dependency exemptions where marriage is a factor, earned
income tax credit, child tax credit, and IRAs. (Rev. Rul. 2013-17
dated 8/29/2013, effective 9/16/2013.)
All married couples must file their income tax returns as married
(married filing jointly, or married filing separately). Total income
taxes might be higher or lower than when each of the married
spouses had to file tax returns as "single."
See Instructions for Form 1040X (Rev. December 2013), available
at www.irs.gov, regarding same-sex married couples: "You may
amend a return filed before September 16, 2013 to change your
filing status to married filing separately or married filing jointly. But
you are not required to change your filing status on a prior return,
even if you amend that return for another reason. In either case,
your amended return must be consistent with the filing status you
choose. You must file the amended return before the expiration of
the period of limitations."
Refund claims could include: (1) taxes paid by an employee for
the value of health insurance coverage provided by the employer
for the employee's spouse, and which was included as part of the
employee's gross income in one or more prior tax years; (2) taxes
paid by an employee on premiums that an employee paid with
after-tax dollars for health insurance coverage for his/her spouse
(e.g. in a cafeteria plan); and (3) Social Security and Medicare
taxes paid by the employee on the health insurance benefits for
his/her spouse. (See Q & A 10-12 in Answers to FAQs for
Individuals of the Same Sex Who are Married, issued by the IRS

1

Adapted, with permission, from "To Marry or Not to Marry" by Arlene Zarembka, Esq. The
author wishes to thank Ms. Zarembka, Joan Burda, Esq., and the National LGBT Bar Association
for assistance in compiling the federal materials obtained herein.

17

in conjunction with Rev. Rul. 2013-17.) The IRS has issued
administrative procedures for adjustments and claims for refunds
or credits for overpayments of employment taxes attributable to
same-sex spouse benefits. See IRS Notice 2013-61 dated
10/28/2013.
2.

Kentucky taxes.
The stay in Bourke v. Beshear obviously complicates the filing of
state returns. Meanwhile, a suit has been filed in Franklin Circuit
Court seeking to require the Revenue Cabinet specifically to
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states. A
decision in that case is unlikely pending the dissolution of the stay
in Bourke.

B.

Retirement Plans
1.

Retirement plans subject to ERISA.
ERISA applies to most employer and union sponsored retirement
plans in private industry. ERISA does not apply to state and local
government plans (including plans covering public school teachers
and school administrators), most church plans, and plans for
federal government employees.
All retirement plans subject to ERISA must provide the same
benefits to an employee married to a person of the same sex as
provided to employees married to opposite-sex spouses, even if
the employee lives in a non-recognition state. (U.S. Department
of Labor, Technical Release #2013-04, dated 9/18/2013).
However, employers are not required to provide benefits to
spouses.
Moreover, experts in health insurance law have
concluded that there currently is no requirement that employers
subject to ERISA who provide health plan coverage to oppositesex spouses of employees must also provide it to same-sex
spouses in non-recognition states (although they may do so if they
so choose).
If a married employee under a plan governed by ERISA wants to
name a beneficiary other than the spouse of his/her retirement
benefits under a defined benefit plan (and most defined
contribution plans), the spouse must sign a consent to such an
election.
A married employee can take a hardship distribution from a
defined contribution plan to pay medical expenses, tuition, or
funeral expenses of his/her spouse, even if the spouse has
consented to the employee naming someone else as the primary
beneficiary of the plan upon the employee's death.
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See www.dol.gov/ebsa for more details about retirement plans
under ERISA.
N.B.: The IRS has announced that it will be issuing a guidance on
the retroactive application of the Windsor decision for retirement
plans in the near future, and the Department of Labor plans to
issue a guidance on the definition of "spouse" in Title 1 of ERISA.
(Bloomberg BNA Weekly Report, 2/3/2014) Whether or not that
guidance will address refusal by employers to treat same-sex
spouses the same as opposite-sex spouses for health plan
coverage remains to be seen.
2.

Distributions from retirement plans (including IRAs).
A spouse (including a same-sex spouse) who is the beneficiary of
a retirement account or plan of his/her spouse has more options
regarding Required Minimum Distributions (RMDs) than a
beneficiary who is not a spouse. A spouse can:
•

Treat the retirement account or plan as her own, or rollover to her own IRA; or

•

Calculate the RMD based on her own current age; or

•

Calculate the RMD based on the deceased spouse's age
at death; or

•

Wait to start taking RMDs until the deceased spouse would
have reached age 70 ½ . No distributions are required from
a Roth IRA until the owner's death.

See www.irs.gov/retirement plans for more information regarding
retirement account distribution rules.
C.

Federal Employees
A federal employee married to a person of the same sex (including
married same-sex employees living in non-recognition states) is entitled
to many of the same benefits to which employees married to a member of
the opposite sex are entitled. This includes naming her spouse as
beneficiary for spousal survivor benefits. The children being raised by
same-sex married couples are entitled to family coverage under the
federal employee's benefits, even if the federal employee has not legally
adopted the children.
In addition, same-sex domestic partners, the children of an employee's
same-sex domestic partner, and some other relatives of the employee's
same-sex domestic partner have been identified by the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) as "family members" for the purposes of
sick leave, funeral leave, the Voluntary Leave Transfer (VLTP) Program,
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the Voluntary Leave Bank (VLBP) Program, and the Emergency Leave
Transfer (ELT) Program.
See "Frequently Asked Questions-Same Sex Domestic Partner Benefits"
(which also includes information about same-sex married couples) on
OPM's website (www.OPM.gov), and the OPM fact sheets listed in that
FAQ, for more details.
D.

Family and Medical Leave Act
Under current regulations, whether a person is a "spouse" under the
FMLA is based on the place of domicile of the employee. Therefore, the
FMLA regulations currently do not require that an employee married to a
same-sex spouse and living in a non-recognition state be given unpaid
leave to care for her spouse. However, an employee living in a nonrecognition state who acts "in loco parentis" with regard to the child of her
spouse or unmarried partner can be entitled to FMLA leave. (DOL Fact
Sheet #28, August 2013). Recent news reports indicate that the DOL
may be planning to change the regulations to include same-sex spouses
living in non-recognition states.

E.

Social Security
In determining whether spousal benefits will be paid to the spouse of a
person who is receiving Social Security benefits (or to the spouse of a
deceased Social Security recipient), Social Security looks to whether the
marriage is recognized in the place of domicile of the wage earner (i.e.
the spouse upon whose earnings a claim for benefits is made) at the time
of application for benefits. This is pursuant to the Social Security statute.
If the marriage is not recognized in the state of domicile of the wage
earner, then spousal benefits are not paid. Instead, Social Security is
holding such applications until a decision is made as to whether or not
such couples are entitled to spousal benefits.
For marriages that are recognized in the place of domicile, if a wageearner is receiving Social Security benefits (whether due to disability or
retirement), the spouse could be entitled to spousal benefits of up to 50
percent of the benefit that the retired or disabled wage-earner is receiving
(and the retired or disabled recipient continues to receive 100 percent of
his own benefit). If a deceased wage-earner was receiving Social
Security benefits prior to death, the surviving spouse could receive 100
percent of the benefits that the deceased spouse was receiving at time of
death. If the surviving spouse is already receiving his own benefits, he
can decide whether it is more advantageous to continue to receive his
own benefits or to receive the deceased spouse's benefits. If there are
children, they also might be eligible for child benefits.
The federal Social Security statute also allows Social Security to pay
spousal benefits to a person who would inherit from the worker as a
spouse would under the laws of intestate succession for personal
property in the state of domicile. 42 U.S.C §416(h). Thus, if the couple
has registered as domestic partners or civil union partners in a state that
20

has a registered domestic partner or civil union statute, the partner of the
wage earner may be eligible for spousal benefits. Further guidance may
be needed from Social Security.
Even if living in a non-recognition state, filing for spousal benefits
immediately (if otherwise eligible) is very important, in order to preserve
the filing date for calculation of back benefits due if Social Security later
recognizes the same-sex marriage, domestic partnership, or civil union.
See the FAQs at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/same-sexcouples/ for
more information. See also the following sections of Social Security's
Program Operations Manual System (POMS):

F.

•

GN 00210.001 Windsor Same-Sex Marriage Claims-Introduction

•

GN 00210.005 Holding Claims, Appeals, and Post-Entitlement
Actions Involving Same-Sex Marriages or Legal Same-Sex
Relationships other than Marriage

•

GN 00210.010 Interviewing Individuals with Claims Involving
Same-Sex Relationships

•

GN 00210.800 Same-Sex Marriages – Supplemental Security
Income

•

GN 00305.005 Determining Marital Status

Department of Defense
The DOD considers all married same-sex couples, both uniformed
service members and DOD civilian employees, to be married for all DOD
benefits purposes, including those living in non-recognition states. Samesex military spouses have access to all military facilities that are available
to military spouses. The DOD also will give "non-chargeable leave" to a
gay service member serving at a duty station that is more than 100 miles
from a state that grants same-sex marriages, so that the couple can travel
to a jurisdiction where they can marry. (DOD Memorandum dated
8/13/2013 and DOD News Release #581-13 dated 8/14/2013.)

G.

Immigration
An American married to a same-sex spouse should be able, in many
cases, to sponsor the spouse for a green card or a visa. Immigration law
is extremely complex. Anyone married to a non-citizen, or who is
considering marriage to a non-citizen, must consult with an attorney
specializing in immigration law to determine whether or not to file an
application to sponsor a spouse for a green card or visa.
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H.

Department of Justice
Attorney General Eric Holder has announced that the DOJ will "interpret
the terms 'spouse,' 'marriage,' 'widow,' 'widower,' 'husband,' 'wife,' and
any other term related to family or marital status in statutes, regulations,
and policies administered, enforced, or interpreted by the Department, to
include married same-sex spouses whenever allowable. The Department
will take the same position in litigation, to the extent consistent with the
lawful statutes, regulations, and policies over which other agencies bear
primary administrative, enforcement, or interpretive responsibility. The
Department will recognize all marriages, including same-sex marriages,
valid in the jurisdiction where the marriage was celebrated to the extent
consistent with law." Moreover, the DOJ will not challenge an assertion of
marital privilege in a civil or criminal case by a party who is married to a
same-sex spouse, even if the couple is living in a non-recognition state.
(Memorandum by the Attorney General dated 2/10/14 to all DOJ
Personnel.)
Likewise, all programs administered under the DOJ (e.g. Public Safety
Officers' Benefits Program, the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, and the Radiation Exposure Compensation Program) will recognize
same-sex marriages that are valid in the place where they were
celebrated. The United States Trustee Program will apply the Bankruptcy
Code and Bankruptcy Rules to same-sex married couples in the same
manner they are applied to opposite-sex married couples to cover
individuals lawfully married in any jurisdiction. The Bureau of Prisons will
interpret all of its policies that are affected by marital status, such as
visitation at federal prisons and next-of-kin notification regarding inmates,
to include all lawful same-sex marriages, regardless of the place of
domicile.

I.

Divorce
In Kentucky, the availability of divorce is currently being litigated in
Jefferson Circuit Court in Romero v. Romero, 13-CI-503351. A decision
in that case, as with action on almost any issue at the state level, may not
be forthcoming until the expiration of the stay in Bourke v. Beshear,
supra. Other states may be available. To wit:
Canada, California, Delaware, D.C., Hawaii, Illinois (after
6/1/2014),* Minnesota, and, in limited circumstances,
Vermont. See "Divorce for Same-Sex Couples Who Live
in Non-Recognition States: A Guide for Attorneys" at
www.nclrights.org (Dec. 2013).
N.B.: Illinois law prohibits marriage by non-residents if the
marriage would be void if contracted in the jurisdiction
where the couple lives. 750 ILCS 5/217 (in Ch. 40., par
217). New Hampshire law does as well.
With the possibility of divorce, consider also the possibility of a prenuptial
agreement. In Kentucky, the consideration for a valid prenuptial agree22

ment is the marriage itself. Settles v. Settles, 114 S.W. 303 (Ky. 1908). If
the ruling in Bourke v. Beshear is properly enforced, then a legal samesex marriage entered into in a foreign jurisdiction is a "marriage" under
Kentucky law and thus valid consideration for a prenuptial agreement.
Query: does it have to be so at the time of solemnization? Do rules of
contract interpretation permit the validation of consideration after the
execution of the contract?
J.

Additional Resources
1.

Whether to Wed: A Legal and Tax Guide for Gay and Lesbian
Couples, by Scott E. Squillace, available for purchase at
http://whether-to-wed.com//.

2.

Sexual Orientation & the Law (2013-2014 edition), Karen
Moulding, Ed. (Thomson Reuters, aka West.)
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SOCIAL SECURITY AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS FOR
SAME-SEX COUPLES AFTER WINDSOR
Kathryn L. Moore

I.

SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
The American Social Security system covers about 96 percent of the American
workforce. It pays two basic types of benefits to workers: (1) old-age (that is,
retirement) benefits 1 and (2) disability benefits. 2 In addition, it provides "auxiliary"
or "derivative" benefits to certain family members of retired, disabled, and
deceased workers. Family member beneficiaries fall into four basic categories:
(1) the spouses of retired or disabled workers; 3 (2) the surviving spouses of
deceased workers; 4 (3) the dependent children of retired, disabled, or deceased
workers; 5 and (4) the dependent parents of deceased workers. 6
On August 9, 2013, the Social Security Administration announced that it had
begun to process some retirement spouse claims for same-sex couples and
paying benefits when due. 7 On December 16, 2013, the Social Security
Administration announced that it had begun to process some surviving spouse
benefits for surviving members of same-sex marriages and paying benefits when
due. 8 In addition, it has said that it is working with the Justice Department to
develop policies on the payment of spouse and surviving spouse benefits for
same-sex couples who live in a state that does not recognize same-sex

1

42 U.S.C. §402(a).

2

42 U.S.C. §423(a).

3

42 U.S.C. §402(b) & (c).

4

42 U.S.C. §402(e) & (f).

5

42 U.S.C. §402(d).

6

42 U.S.C. §402(g).

7

Social Security, News Release, Statement of Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social
Secuity on Payments to Same-Sex Couples (Aug. 9, 2013), available at
http://socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/pr/doma-statement-pr.html.
8

Social Security, News Release, Statement of Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social
Secuity on New Payments to Same-Sex Married Couples (Dec. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/pr/doma-new-payments-pr.html.
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marriage. 9 It encourages individuals who may be eligible for such benefits to
apply now to protect against the potential loss of any benefits. 10
A

Calculating Social Security Benefits
Both worker benefits and family member benefits are based on the
worker's earnings record. Accordingly, this section will first provide a
basic overview of how workers' benefits are calculated. It will then
describe how spouse and surviving spouse benefits are calculated.
1.

Workers' benefits.
Workers' old-age benefits are based on thirty-five years of
earnings, which are indexed for inflation. 11 Average adjusted
earnings, or "average indexed monthly earnings" ("AIME"), are
calculated by taking the best thirty-five years of earnings adjusted
for past wage inflation, adding them together and dividing by 420
(the number of months in thirty-five years). Average adjusted
earnings are then multiplied by a progressive benefit formula to
determine the "primary insurance amount" (PIA), or how much of
the average adjusted earnings should be replaced. 12 The formula
replaces a higher percentage of adjusted average earnings the
lower one's average earnings so that the ratio of benefits to
average earnings is higher for those with low average earnings
than for those with high average earnings. For those reaching
age sixty-two in 2014, the formula replaces 90 percent of the first
$816 of AIME, plus 32 percent of AIME between $816 and $4,917,
plus 15 percent of AIME above $4,917, up to the Social Security
maximum benefit. 13 Disability benefits are calculated in a similar
manner, but fewer than thirty-five years may be taken into account
in determining the PIA for a disabled worker. 14

9

Social Security Administration, Frequently Asked Questions, "Do I qualify for benefits if I live in
pace that prohibits or does not recognize same sex marriage or other legal same sex
relationships?", available at https://faq.ssa.gov/link/portal/34011/34019/Article/3547/Do-I-qualifyfor-benefits-if-I-live-in-a-place-that-prohibits-or-does-not-recognize-same-sex-marriages-or-otherlegal-same-sex-relationships.
10

Id.

11

42 U.S.C. §415(b). To index earnings, "each year's wage is multiplied by an 'indexing factor,'
which equals the ratio of the average national wage in the year the worker turns sixty to the
average national wage in the year to be indexed. For administrative convenience, wages earned
at age sixty or later are left at their nominal value in the indexing process." C. Eugene Steuerle &
st
Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21 Century: Right and Wrong Approaches to
Reform 76 (1994).
12

42 U.S.C. §415(a).

13

In 2013, the maximum Social Security benefit for a worker retiring at the full retirement age is
$2,533 per month or $30,396.

26

Under current law, a worker 15 is entitled to receive "full benefits,"
that is, benefits equal to her PIA, at "Full Retirement Age." 16 The
full retirement age is currently age sixty-six for individuals who
reach sixty-two in 2005 or later. 17 Beginning in 2017, it is
scheduled to increase gradually to age sixty-seven by the year
2022. 18 A worker may elect to receive actuarially reduced benefits
as early as age sixty-two. 19 Similarly, a worker may elect to delay
the receipt of benefits beyond age sixty-five and receive an
actuarially increased benefit. 20 A "totally disabled" 21 worker 22 is
also entitled to receive benefits equal to her PIA. 23
2.

Spouse benefits.
Upon reaching full retirement age, the spouse of a retired or
disabled worker is entitled to receive a spouse benefit equal to 50
percent of the worker's PIA. 24 The spouse may elect to receive a
reduced benefit as early as age sixty-two. 25 Spouses who are
entitled to receive benefits based upon their own earnings record
as well as their spouse's earnings record may only receive a total

14

For disabled workers, the PIA is calculated as though the worker had attained age sixty-two at
the time of disablement. 42 U.S.C. §423(a)(2).
15

In order to be eligible for old-age benefits, a worker must be "fully insured”; that is, the worker
must have worked in covered employment for a long enough period of time. 42 U.S.C.
§§402(a)(1) & 414.
16

42 U.S.C. §402(a).

17

42 U.S.C. §416(l).

18

42 U.S.C. §416(l). The full retirement age was sixty-five for individuals who reached sixty-two
before 2000. It gradually increased from sixty-five to sixty-six for individuals who reached sixtytwo between 2000 and 2005. Id.
19

42 U.S.C. §402(q)(1) & (9). If a worker with a full retirement age of sixty-six elects to begin
receiving benefits at age sixty-two, the worker's benefit will be equal to 75 percent of the benefit
the worker would have been entitled to had the worker waited until the full retirement age to retire.
20

42 U.S.C. §402(w). For all workers born after 1942, the delayed retirement credit is 8 percent
per year until age seventy.
21

42 U.S.C. §423(a)(1)(D) & (d).

22

In order to be eligible for old-age benefits, a totally disabled worker must be "fully insured" and
"disability insured"; that is, the worker must have worked in covered employment long enough
and recently enough. 42 U.S.C. §423(a)(1)(A) & (c).
23

42 U.S.C. §423(a).

24

42 U.S.C. §402(b)(2).

25

The spousal benefit is reduced by a greater percentage than the reduction applied to retired
worker's benefits.

27

benefit equal to the larger of the two benefits. 26 Thus, those
spouses whose worker's benefit exceeds their spouse benefit are
only entitled to receive their own worker's benefit. In contrast,
"dually entitled" beneficiaries, that is, spouses whose spouse
benefit exceeds their worker's benefit, are only entitled to a total
benefit equal to their spouse benefit.
3.

Surviving spouse benefits.
The surviving spouse of an insured worker is entitled to receive a
surviving spouse benefit equal to 100 percent of the deceased
worker's PIA if the surviving spouse has reached full retirement
age. 27 Surviving spouses as young as age sixty may elect to
receive a reduced benefit. 28 Again, working spouses are only
entitled to receive a total benefit equal to the larger of their own
worker's benefit or their surviving spouse benefit. 29

B

Maximizing Social Security Benefits
Prior to reaching the full retirement age, a married individual who files for
benefits is subject to a "deemed filing" provision. Under the "deemed
filing provision," the individual is assumed to be filing for both the
individual's worker's benefit (based on the individual's own earnings
record) and the individual's spouse benefit (based on a percentage of his
or her spouse's earnings record). The Social Security Administration
compares the two benefits and awards the higher of the two benefits. 30
Once an individual reaches full retirement age, deemed filing no longer
applies and an individual may elect whether to receive the individual's
own worker's benefit or a spouse benefit. Thus, married individuals can
elect to receive a spouse benefit at age sixty-six and later switch to their
own retired worker's benefit. This provides married couples with some
planning opportunities to coordinate spouse and surviving spouse
benefits and maximize their total benefits as a couple. 31

26

42 U.S.C. §402(k)(3)(A).

27

42 U.S.C. §§402(e)(2)(A) & (f)(2)(A).

28

42 U.S.C. §§402(q)(1).

29

42 U.S.C. §402(k)(3)(B).

30

Alicia H. Munnell, et al., Strange But True: Claim Social Security Now, Claim More Later,
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Brief No. 9-9 (April 2009).
31

For a discussion of the various claiming strategies and opportunities to maximize benefits, see
Francine J. Lipman, and James E. Williamson, "Social Security Benefits Formula 101: A Practical
Primer," ABA Section of Taxation Newsquarterly 14 (Summer 2010); Francine J. Lipman, and
James E. Williamson, "Social Security Spouse and Survivor Benefits 101: Practical Primer Part II
(Or Another Reason to Put a Ring on It)," ABA Section of Taxation Newsquarterly 10 (Fall 2010);
Alicia H. Munnell, et al., Strange But True: Claim Social Security Now, Claim More Later, Center

28

There are two principal maximizing strategies: (1) file and suspend, and
(2) claim now, claim more later.
1.

File and suspend.
Under this scenario, the higher income earning spouse files for his
or her Social Security benefit at full retirement age so that the
lower income earning spouse can start receiving a spouse benefit.
The higher earning spouse suspends his or her benefit to start
earning the delayed retirement credits until age seventy. At that
time, the higher earning spouse would begin to collect his or her
own higher benefit.

2.

Claim now, claim more later.
Under this scenario, the lower earning spouse applies for his or
her benefits at full retirement age. The higher earning spouse then
applies for a spouse benefit at his or her full retirement age and
delays applying for his or her own benefit until the higher earning
spouse reaches age seventy. At age seventy, the higher earning
spouse would then switch over to his or her own higher benefit.
As rule of thumb, it is generally a good idea for the highest income
earner in the marriage to delay receipt of Social Security benefits
until age seventy because this will give couple the highest income
while they're both alive and the highest death benefit when one
passes away.

II.

OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
While Social Security benefits are mandatory for most employers, many
employers also offer additional employee benefits, such as 401(k) plans. The
provision of such benefits is purely voluntary; no federal law requires that
employers offer such benefits. If, however, an employer elects to offer voluntary
employee benefit plans, the plans are generally 32 regulated by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 33 In addition, in order to
receive favorable income tax treatment, such plans must satisfy requirements set
forth in the Internal Revenue Code. 34

for Retirement Research at Boston College Brief No. 9-9 (April 2009); Alicia H. Munnell et al.,
Strange But True: Claim and Suspend Social Security, Center for Retirement Research at Boston
College Brief No. 9-11 (May 2009); Steven A. Sass, When Should Married Men Claim Social
Security Benefits?, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Brief No. 8-4 (March
2008).
32

ERISA only applies to private-sector employee benefit plans; it does not apply to governmental
plans. ERISA §4(b), 29 U.S.C. §1003(b).
33

Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).

34

See, e.g. IRC §401(a) (setting forth qualification requirements for most employer-sponsored
retirement plans).
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In Rev. Rul. 2013-17, the Internal Revenue Service announced that effective
September 16, 2013, same-sex couples married in a state or foreign jurisdiction
that recognizes same-sex marriage will be treated as married for federal tax and
qualified retirement plan purposes. In Technical Release 2013-04, the
Department of Labor, which regulates many of ERISA's requirements, similarly
adopted the "state of celebration" rule for employee benefit plan purposes. Thus,
for employee benefit plan purposes, the state where the marriage takes place
(that is, the state of celebration), and not the state of residence, determines if a
same-sex couple is entitled to spousal rights and obligations.
Neither ERISA nor the Internal Revenue Code require that plans define the term
"spouse." Moreover, many plans do not define the term. If, however, a plan does
define the term spouse, the plan may not define the term to exclude same-sex
spouses who were legally married in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex
marriages. In addition, in operating plans, all plan sponsors and plan
administrators must ensure that spousal rights, 35 such as qualified joint and
survivor annuities (QJSAs), 36 qualified preretirement survivor annuities
(QPSAs), 37 qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs), 38 hardship
distributions, 39 and required minimum distribution relief 40 extend to same-sex
spouses. 41

35

For a more detailed discussion of the effect of Windsor on employee benefit plans, see Laura
Pergine and Janet Luxton, "The DOMA Decision and Retirement Plans," Vanguard Strategic
Retirement Consulting Brief (Nov. 2013); Elizabeth Thomas Dold and David N. Levine, "A Look at
How the Supreme Court's DOMA Decision Impacts Employee Benefit Plans," Taxes – The
Magazine 13 (Sept. 2013).
36

See ERISA 205(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1055(a)(1); IRC §401(a)(11)(A)(i).

37

See ERISA 205(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1055(a)(2); IRC §401(a)(11)(A)(ii)

38

See ERISA 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. §1056(d)(3); IRC §401(a)(13)(B).

39

See Treas. Reg. §1.401(k)-1(d)(3)(iii)(B)(3)&(5) (permitting plan to authorize hardship
withdrawal for medical, tuition, and funeral expenses of spouse).
40

See IRC §401(a)(9)(B)(iv).

41

For additional guidance on the rules applicable to cafeteria plans, flexible spending
arrangements (FSAs), and health savings accounts (HSAs), see IRS Notice 2014-01.
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